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THE RIGHT TO PROCEED PRO SE
anda has been overruled in effect by Mosley. However, the case af-
firms Miranda in name and uses language from Miranda to identify the
first constitutionally required police procedure for custodial interroga-
tions.
But protecting a procedural right with the Constitution is of little
help to the accused if the "constitutional" procedure is defined so
vaguely that the police and courts can easily circumvent it. This
vagueness, combined with the Court's attitude of expanding the admissi-
bility of custodial confessions and a willingness to read facts to fit the
procedural requirement, seems certain to have the effect of freeing the
police from the restraint of' truly honoring the rights of the accused.
PILIP P.W. YATES
Criminal Procedure-The Right to Proceed Pro Se: Judicial
Gymnastics with the Sixth Amendment
Within the past two decades the United States Supreme Court has
been zealous in ensuring the right of defendants in state criminal
prosecutions to receive the assistance of counsel. The sixth amendment
guarantee of assistance of counsel to defendants in federal criminal
prosecutions has been extended to state criminal prosecutions under the
auspices of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The
underlying premise of the "assistance of counsel" cases is that inherent
unfairness exists in any criminal proceeding in which the accused has
been denied the assistance of counsel to prepare his defense.' Argua-
bly, a natural extension of this reasoning might indicate that any convic-
tion obtained in a criminal trial absent representation by an attorney for
the accused is per se tainted and unfair. However, such an extension
clashes with an attempt by a criminal defendant to exercise the right of
self representation recognized on either a constitutional or a statutory
level by most state and all federal courts. This quandary raises the
question whether a state may constitutionally deny a valid request by a
1. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (requirement of assistance of
counsel before imprisonment for any offense); Gideon v. Wainwrigbt, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (requirement of assistance of counsel for defendants in state felony prosecu-
tions); see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (requirement of assistance of counsel
for defendants in state capital offense prosecutions).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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criminal defendant to proceed pro se and instead require that the
defendant be represented by an attorney, to forestall any subsequent
claim of prejudice by the accused based upon the absence of legal
guidance. Facing this novel issue in Faretta v. California," a divided
United States Supreme Court unequivocally held that state criminal
defendants have a constitutional right to proceed pro se upon a free and
knowledgeable waiver of assistance of counsel.4
The Faretta case arose out of a grand theft charge filed against
the defendant, Anthony Faretta, in the Superior Court of Los Angeles,
California. The trial judge granted defendant's request to proceed pro
se but retained flexibility to withdraw the ruling if it should later become
evident to the court that Faretta was incapable of effective self-represen-
tation.5 The judge subsequently examined Faretta's ability to represent
himself and withdrew Faretta's permission to proceed pro se after
expressing dissatisfaction with Faretta's responses concerning questions
of law.' The trial judge appointed a defense counsel' and denied
Faretta's requests for permission to act as co-counsel, forcing Faretta to
present his defense solely through his attorney.8 After his subsequent
3. 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975). Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion. Mr.
Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented and
joined in separate opinions written by Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice
Blackmun.
4. Id. at 2541.
5. The trial court based this ruling upon an earlier decision of the Supreme Court
of California in People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233
(1972). In Sharp, the California Supreme Court held that an accused had no constitu-
tional right of federal or state origin to proceed pro se in California criminal trials.
Consequently, under the Sharp rule, permission to proceed pro se was a matter of
discretion for the trial judge. Sharp was decided under CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 13 (1879):
"In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right
. . . to appear and defend in person and with counsel. . . . (emphasis added)." Before
the Sharp decision was announced, section 13 was amended to clarify the status of self-
representation in California (the amendment was prospective only): "In criminal
prosecutions, in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right. . . to have
the assistance of counsel . . . and to be personally present with counsel. . . . The
Legislature shall have power to require the defendant in a felony case to have the
assistance of counsel ...... CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13 (emphasis added). In contrast,
thirty-six state constitutions explicitly provide criminal defendants with the right to
proceed pro se. Citations to the state constitutions are found in 95 S. Ct. at 2530 n.10.
Additionally, several state courts have declared that the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to proceed pro se. E.g., State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 190 S.E.2d
164 (1972); Zasada v. State, 19 NJ. Super. 589, 89 A.2d 45 (App. Div. 1952).
6. Faretta was a high school graduate who had previously proceeded pro se in a
criminal prosecution. 95 S. Ct. at 2527. For excerpts from the colloquy between the
trial judge and Faretta at the sua sponte hearing, see id. at 2528 n.3.
7. Faretta's dissatisfaction with the public defender's office had precipitated his
request to proceed pro se. Id. at 2527.
8. Id. at 2529.
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conviction and the exhaustion of all avenues of appeal within the
California court system, 9 Faretta's petition for certiorari was granted by
the United States Supreme Court.10
The Supreme Court articulated the Faretta issue as "[w]hether the
Constitution forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a defendant
.... "11 The Court held that no state can constitutionally require a
criminal defendant to be represented by an attorney over the defendant's
protestations. Support for this conclusion came from three distinct
sources. First, the Supreme Court surveyed the unwavering protection
that the federal courts have afforded the right to proceed pro se in
federal criminal trials.' 2 Then, the Court analyzed the evolution of the
right to proceed pro se from the perspectives of the English common
law, colonial judicial practices, and the historical evolution of the sixth
amendment.' 3 Finally, the Court examined the tension between indi-
vidual autonomy and the potential unfairness of a criminal trial in which
the defendant represents himself.' 4
The right to proceed pro se in the federal court system is unques-
tioned since it has been expressly guaranteed to federal criminal defend-
ants under the Judiciary Act of 178915 and its successors.' 6 Yet,
historically the federal courts have taken a broader position with regard
to the right of self-representation thin mere statutory fiat. In Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCannl7 the trial judge allowed a criminal
defendant to proceed pro se and to waive trial by jury. The subsequent
trial court conviction was reversed by the court of appeals on the ground
that waiver of trial by jury is only effective when made with assistance of
counsel.V 8 However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court convic-
tion, holding that a defendant may waive his constitutional rights to trial
9. Faretta's contentions concerning a constitutional right to proceed pro se were
summarily dismissed by the Califorhia appellate courts pursuant to the Sharp ruling. Id.
10. 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
11. 95 S. Ct. at 2531.
12. Id. at 2530-32.
13. Id. at 2532-40.
14. Id. at 2540-41.
15. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) currently provides that: "In all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by
the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein." The right to proceed pro se also is granted to criminal defendants under FED.
PL CPms. P. 44(a).
17. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
18. United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1942). Learned
Hand delivered the opinion of the court of appeals.
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by jury and to assistance of counsel provided that the waivers are
knowingly and freely made.' 9
The main issue in Adams was the validity of a waiver of an
affirmative constitutional right, e.g., trial by jury, in the absence of
assistance of counsel to advise the defendant of the consequences of such
a waiver. But the Supreme Court nevertheless outlined its views on the
right to proceed pro se via dictum:
The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dis-
pense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms. They rest on
considerations that go to the substance of an accused's position
before the law. The public conscience must be satisfied that fair-
ness dominates the administration of justice. An accused must have
the means of presenting his best defense. He must have time and
facilities for investigation and for the production of evidence. But
evidence and truth are of no avail unless they can be adequately
presented. Essential fairness is lacking if an accused cannot put
his case effectively in court. But the Constitution does not force
a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his Constitutional right
to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice
is made with eyes open .... 20
Subsequently, in Carter v. Illinois21 the Supreme Court reinforced the
Adams dictum by declaring that "[n]either the historic conception of
Due Process nor the vitality it derives from progressive standards of
justice denies a person the right to defend himself ... *22 But the
Court retreated from interference into state criminal procedure concern-
ing the waiver of constitutional rights by stating:
But the Due Process Clause has never been perverted so as to force
upon the forty-eight States a uniform code of criminal procedure.
... The Constitution commands the States to assure fair judgment.
Procedural details for securing fairness it leaves to the States. 23
Thus, in Carter the focus of the Court centered upon achieving a fair
outcome in a criminal proceeding rather than providing the defendant
with an opportunity to proceed pro se. Although the actual holding is
expansive with regard to the latitude given a criminal defendant to waive
the affirmative constitutional right of trial by jury without assistance of
19. 317 U.S. at 275.
20. Id. at 279 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
21. 329 U.S. 173 (1946). In Carter, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of
petitioner who had pleaded guilty to murder without the assistance of counsel. The
Court refused to carry its scrutiny past the common law record of the case to determine
the validity of the waiver.
22. Id. at 174.
23, Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
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counsel, the fairness concerns expressed by the Court put the decision
into a different perspective, casting shadows on the reach of the Adams
dictum.
The courts of appeals have directly held in several cases that the
right to proceed pro se is constitutionally protected by the sixth amend-
ment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 24  The
first analytically significant case espousing the right of self-representa-
tion as an affirmative constitutional right is United States v. Plattner2 5
In Plattner, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals elevated the right to
proceed pro se to the level of the constitutional safeguards expressly
enumerated in the sixth amendment and further stated that the right of
self-representation could not be construed as merely statutory in ori-
gin.26 The court of appeals then declared that denial of self-representa-
tion was prejudicial per se2 and required automatic reversal when a
defendant had been denied the right to proceed pro se without any
attempt by the trial court to ascertain the adequacy of -the accused to
waive his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.2 8
Although the majority in Faretta was quite comfortable with the
prevailing court of appeals viewpoint, the dissenters were reluctant to
embrace a court of appeals doctrine founded, at least in part, upon the
sketchy Adams and Carter dicta. Mr. Chief Justice Burger pointed out
in his dissent that Adams and Carter dealt specifically with the conse-
quences of a waiver of trial by jury and a guilty plea, repsectively, made
without the assistance of counsel. Hence, the issue was not whether the
accused had an affirmative right to proceed pro se but whether uncoun-
seled waivers of fundamental constitutional rights were per se defec-
24. E.g., United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
930 (1970); Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1048 (1970); United States v. Stemman, 415 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 907 (1970); Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1021 (1970); United States ex rel. Maldonaldo v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d
271 (2d Cir. 1964). Contra, Van Natton v. United States, 357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir.
1966) (right of self-representation solely statutory right).
25. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). The case involved the use of assigned counsel to
argue a petition for a writ of error coram nobis filed by defendant after his conviction
for interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant had prepared the
petition himself, and he appealed from the district court order dismissing the petition on
the ground that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to represent himself
at the hearing.
26. Id. at 273.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 276.
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tive.29 Since the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in both
Adams and Carter, the obvious answer is that a defendant may waive
his constitutional rights in some circumstances. However, in Singer v.
United States30 the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he ability to waive
a constitutional right [e.g., trial by jury] does not ordinarily carry with
it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.131  The Court in
Singer found that no prejudice could result from a refusal to permit
waiver of a constitutional safeguard because the defendant then receives
exactly what the Constitution requires for his protection. 32 This logic
could arguably be extended to the issue of self-representation in that
denial of the right to proceed pro se may be viewed as resulting merely
in the exercise of the constitutional right of assistance of counsel. In
any event, the judicial background on the right of self-representation,
standing alone, is somewhat less than conclusive in forming a constitu-
tional basis for an affirmative right to proceed pro se.
As a supplement to the judicial viewpoint, the majority finds
support for its position in parallel developments in the English common
law, colonial trial practices, and the legislative context of the sixth
amendment itself. Presently, an individual has an affirmative right of
self-representatfibn under the English common law.33 But this is hardly
surprising or probative in that common-law defendants were historically
forced to proceed pro se.34 Indeed, it was not until 1836 that the last
vestiges of compulsory self-representation in felony prosecutions were
removed by statute.3 Similarly, colonial trial procedures regularly
afforded the defendant the opportunity to represent himself, 0 but
whether this practice arose from respect for individual liberties or
whether the practice was fostered by common law traditions derived
from the dearth of trained counsel in the colonies is not readily ascer-
tainable.
The majority also cited the legislative history of the sixth amend-
ment as indicative of an affirmative constitutional right to proceed pro
29. 95 S. Ct. at 2544.
30. 380 U.S. 24 (1965). In Singer, defendant was convicted of federal mail fraud
charges in a jury trial despite repeated demands by him for trial by the judge alone. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 25, 36.
31. Id. at 34-35.
32. Id. at 36.
33. R. v. Woodward, [1944] K.B. 118.
34. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MATLA4ND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAvi 211 (2d ed.
1923).
35. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1 (1836).
36. 95 S. CL at 2537.
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se. Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789,37 guaranteeing the right
of self-representation in the federal courts, just one day prior to the
submission of the sixth amendment to Congress for its approval.2s In
the subsequent congressional debate on the sixth amendment, reference
to the right to proceed pro se was conspicuously absent.3 9 The majority
propounded that this was indicative that the right to self-representation
was deemed by all to be so pervasive and fundamental that it was a non-
issue.4" However, this logic raised the inevitable question of why
Congress affirmatively granted the right to proceed pro se in a federal
statute if such a right was considered inherent and patently obvious. The
dissenters found the Court's argument unpersuasive in that the statutory
grant of the right to proceed pro se and the corresponding omission in
the sixth amendment, which had been drafted by essentially the same
persons, lent credence to the inference that the exclusion was pur-
poseful.41 Neither viewpoint could legitimately be termed persuasive.
The final and most compelling argument of the majority was the
necessity of protecting individual autonomy.4" The Court made no
effort to side-step the central premise in Gideon v. Wainwright" and
Argersinger v. Hamlin44 that fundamental fairness requires that an
accused be represented by counsel. 45 Rather, the Court conceded that
the average criminal defendant who proceeds pro se will indeed dimin-
ish the likelihood of a successful defense in his case.4 6 However, the
37. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 92.
38. 95 S. Ct. at 2539.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2546.
42. See generally Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due
Process, 54 MINN. L. Ruv. 1175 (1970); Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal
Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALuF. L. Rav. 1479 (1971); Note,
Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel-Self-Representation Not Guaranteed by Sixth
Amendment, 18 N.Y.L.F. 990 (1973).
43. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
45. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
46. 95 S. Ct. at 2540. Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
68-69 (1932), presented the classic critique of the pro se defense:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he had a perfect one. He requires the guid-
ing hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
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Court refused to entwine personal liberties with statistical probabilities
and stated that respect for individual freedom, even if exercised in an
apparently self-destructive manner, demands an affirmative right for an
individual to conduct his own defense.4 At no other time are individual
liberties more precious to a citizen than when a state subjects that
citizen to the rigors of its criminal justice process. 48  Accordingly, in the
very hour of need, a defendant should be afforded the widest possible
latitude to prove his innocence to give the constitutional safeguards of
the sixth amendment their fullest meaning.
The dissenting opinions did not belittle the value of individual
autonomy and free choice within the criminal justice system. But the
dissenters found a preeminent government interest in insuring a just
result through compulsory assistance of counsel. 49 In the criminal
courts the prosecution and the trial judge must insure that true justice is
realized to maintain public confidence in the efficacy of the criminal
justice process.5" Objective standards of impartiality require that court
systems appoint attorneys for defendants without counsel since the
majority of the populace feels that representation by counsel is a neces-
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not
know how to establish his innocence.
47. 95 S. Ct. at 2540.
48. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reversal of
conviction of "D.C. Nine" who had vandalized the Dow Chemical Corporation's District
of Columbia offices). Although the trial judge had granted defendants latitude with
respect to addressing the trial court, he had denied defendants' petition to proceed pro se.
In reversing the conviction, the court of appeals expounded on the nature of the right to
proceed pro se:
It [the right of self-representation] is designed to safeguard the dignity and
autonomy of those whose circumstances or activities have thrust them involun-
tarily into the criminal process. An accused has a fundamental right to con-
front his accusers and his "country," to present himself and his position to the
jury not merely as a witness or through a "mouthpiece," but as a man on trial
who elects to plead his own cause. He is not obliged to seek what counsel
would record as a victory but what he sees as tantamount to condemnation or
doubt rather than vindication. A defendant has the moral right to stand alone
in his hour of trial. The denial of that right is not to be redeemed through
the prior estimate of someone else that the practical position of the defendant
will be enhanced through representation by another or the subsequent conclu-
sion that defendant's practical position has not been disadvantaged.
Id. at 1128.
49. 95 S. Ct. at 2543, 2548.
50. Grano, supra note 42, at 1196. The Supreme Court articulated this view in
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) (conviction of petitioner for conspiracy to
utter counterfeit notes). In reversing the conviction because of improper prosecutorial
conduct, the Supreme Court declared: 'The United States Attorney is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done." Id. at 88. Similar language may be found in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963).
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sary precondition to a fair trial.51 Continued public support for the
judicial process is dependent upon widespread popular sentiment that no
arm of the state or federal governments will strip a citizen of his rights
except through meticulous adherence to procedures deemed most likely
to produce just results.51 Mr. Justice Blackmun concluded that the
criminal justice system could not assuage the damage to society inherent
in unjust outcomes by pointing to the vindication of an individual's right
to proceed pro se. Conversely, Mr. Justice Blackmun reasoned that any
damage to individual freedom resulting from denial of the pro se
privilege would be mitigated by the greater fairness of a trial with
assistance of counsel. Complaints about the fairness of criminal pro-
ceedings from a convicted defendant who received the full benefit of the
express constitutional right to assistance of counsel ring hollow despite
the abridgement of individual autonomy. 3
Despite the skepticism of the dissenters, there are rational reasons
for a criminal defendant to seek to proceed pro se.54 The glaring flaw
in the dissenters' position is their assumption that appointed counsel will
provide effective representation for indigent defendants. :Patently, the
empirical norm for appointed counsel does not approach total effective-
ness. Blatant incompetence has appropriate remedies both in the trial
court and at the appellate level. But marginally inadequate represefita-
tion presents an insidious dilemma for the indigent defendant under the
minority view. Faretta's request to proceed pro se was rooted in his
belief that the public defender could not devote the time that Faretta felt
was necessary for a successful defense.55 Under California law, the sole
basis for reversal for ineffective representation is a showing by the
accused that the errors of defense counsel reduced the trial to a "sham
and a farce. 56  Clearly, a defense limited by the time and budgetary
constraints of the public defender's office might be "inadequate" in
certain circumstances and yet not constitute a "sham and a farce." If
the appointed counsel proves ineffective, the accused must either sit
mute and sustain the consequences or he must waive his fifth amend-
51. Grano, supra note 42, at 1195-96.
52. Id.
53. 95 S. Ct. at 2548.
54. Possible rational reasons for seeking to proceed pro se are: (1) distrust of
appointed counsel and/or the legal process as a whole; (2) political motivations; (3)
faith in the ultimate vindication of an innocent defendant by the judicial system; and (4)
the tactical desire to gain empathy with the jury. Note, 18 N.Y.L.F., supra note 42, at
996.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2527.
56. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
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ment right to silence and testify in his own behalf. This situation is
constitutionally untenable as the accused is, in fact, forced to waive his
right to remain silent to present a viable defense. To forestall this
dilemma, qualitative guarantees of effective representation must accom-
pany any denial of the right to proceed pro se. Without such guaran-
tees, the dissenters' position is constitutionally defective.
The majority opinion is praiseworthy at the very least for its
concern with freedom of individual choice. With the present awesome
concentration of power in governmental bodies, any minor victory for
individual autonomy is meritorious on its face. However, society's
interest in achieving a fair and impartial judicial process must predomi-
nate over the autonomy interest. Public doubt concerning the fairness
of criminal proceedings strikes at the very core of government. While
paying lip service to this ideal, the minority's position fails to insure the
essence of a fair trial, i.e. effective assistance of counsel. Until the
Supreme Court deals decisively with the spectre of inadequate represen-
tation for indigent defendants that haunts many criminal proceedings,
the right of self-representation must remain unfettered. Hopefully, if
the Supreme Court does promulgate guidelines to guarantee effective
representation for indigent defendants, the Court will re-examine the
Faretta decision in the context of the preeminent public interest in
ensuring justice in the trial courts.
MICHAEL S. IvEs
Federal Income Tax-Use of Installment Sale Reporting for Sales
Between Related Taxpayers: The Separate v. Single Economic
Entity Argument
Nye v. United States,' a case of first impression,2 presented the
issue whether a purported installment sale by a wife to her husband,
followed by an outright disposition of the property by the husband to a
1. No. C-374-D-73 (M.D.N.C., May 16, 1975) [hereinafter cited as The District
Court Opinion]. The case was decided on a stipulation of facts and cross motions for
summary judgment. The United States initially appealed the case to the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit (Court of Appeals No. 75-1905) but subsequently withdrew the
appeal. Counsel for plaintiffs in Nye reports that he has received correspondence from
attorneys in a number of other jurisdictions who are currently involved with factually
similar cases. Interview with R. Roy Mitchell Jr., attorney for plaintiffs, in Durham,
North Carolina, Jan. 20, 1976. Apparently the Internal Revenue Service has decided to
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